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IN THE SUPR.EME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LORIN PEC·K and
MARY C. PECK, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case
No. 8721

WILLIAM REED JUDD, JR., and
THEDA vV. JUDD, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

INTRODUCTION
(Numbers in parenthesis refer t~o pages of the record.
Page 103 of the record should follow Page 100.)
This action was instituted by plaintiffs to regain
possession of the property subject to the suit, for a
writ of repossession, to adjudge defendants guilty of
unlawful detainer, for treble damages, and for costs and
disbursements and a reasonable attorney's fee.
The court adjudged plaintiffs entitled to immediate
possession, defendants guilty of unlawful detainer, plaintiffs entitled to writ of restituti~on, defendants were not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

entitled to any relief on their counterclaims and have
no equity in property and contract null and void and
wholly ineffective for any purpose whatsoever and should
be cancelled and terminated.
An appeal is taken by defendants.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS FINDING DEFENDANTS
WERE IN DEFAULT, FORFEITURE WAS AGREEMENT OF
PARTIES IN EVENT OF DEFAULT, LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IN AMOUNT AWARDED WAS PURSUANT TO
CONTRACT, LIQUIDATED DAMAGES WERE NOT UNCONSCOUNABLE AND WERE IN FACT LESS THAN DEFENDANTS TOOK FROM PROPERTIES, AND FORFEITURE
BASED ON ACTS OF DEFENDANTS AND JUSTIFIED
UNDER LAW OF STATE OF UTAH.
POINT II.
TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT EXCLUDE DEFENDANTS'
EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO IMPROVEMENTS AND DID NOT
ERR IN EXCLUDING DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE AS TO
MAINTENANCE.
POINT III.
EVIDENCE SUSTAINS FINDING THAT PROPERTIES
INVOLVED HAD A REASONABLE l\IARI{ET VALUE OF
$40,000.00, AT THE TIME PLAINTIFFS TOOK OVER ACTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTIES FROM DEFENDANTS.
POINT IV.
COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT REQUIRING PLAINTIFFS TO REFUND TO DEFENDANTS ALL MONIES PAID
TO PLAINTIFFS BY DEFENDANTS ON CONTRACT TERliINATED BY DEFENDANTS BY REASON OF DEFAULT OF
DEFENDANTS.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO CONTRAC·Ts
On September 30, 1950, Lorin Peck and Mary C.
Peck hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs, respondents
herein, under .an Apartment Listing on a Sales Agency
Contract of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board Multiple
Listing Bureau, listed the properties known as 121 to
130 East 7th South and 658 to 664 Edison Street, to sell
for the price of $75,000.00, requiring $35,000.00 cash and
the balance of $40,000.00, at $300.00 per month with
interest at 4% per annum, indic.ating that the units contained 23 apartments, three of which were furnished,
together with four garages. Said listing cited a mortgage
contract of $40,000, payable at $300.00 per month to
Floyd Burge and bearing 4% interest on unpaid b.alance.
Said listing was with R. J. Chapman of Utah Realty
and Construction Co. Exhibit 15.
On Oct~ober 24, 1950, William R. Judd, Jr. and Theda
W. Judd, hereinafter referred to as the defendants,
appellants herein, together with Lorin Peck, one of plaintiffs, signed an Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement
whereby defendants were to pay to plaintiffs the sum
of $75,000.00 for said properties, $4,600.00 in equity in
a real estate contract and the balance at the rate of
$600.00 per month, plus 1/12 of the ye.arly taxes, payable
monthly, and interest of 4% on the amount due by plaintiffs on their contract of purchase with Burge and 5%
on the balance of the amount over and above the amount
due Burge and due and owing to plaintiffs. Exhibit 16.
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On October 25, 1950, plaintiffs and defendants signed
and executed a Uniform Real Estate Contract p~roviding
f~or the sale of said properties from plaintiffs to defendants for the sum of $75,000.00 payable $10,700.00 down
as cash, and $600.00 or more, on December 1, 1950, and
$600.00 or more, on or before the first day of each and
every month thereafter until the entire principal, together with interest, shall have been paid in full, and
it was also provided that defendants are to deposit
monthly with plaintiffs a sum equal to 1/12 of the annual
tax for the preceding calendar year, and prior to the
30th day of November, of each year the sums thus
deposited shall be applied in payment of general taxes
for the current year, and defendants agreed that at any
time there was .a deficiency between the amount deposited
and the amount due, to make up the same. Interest was
to be at the rate of 4% on the amount due by plaintiffs
to Burge and 5% on the difference between the amount
due to Burge and the balance due on said Uniform Real
Estate Contract. Exhibit 1.
A pertinent provision of said contract reads as
f~ollo\YS : In the eYent of a failure to coinply "ith the
ter1ns h0reof the Buyer~ or upon failure to make any
pay1nents \\~hen the sa1ne shall beeo1ne due, or -within
thirty days thereafter, the Seller, shall, at his option,
h<\ relPa f'rd fro In .all obiga tions in la"T and equity to
eonvPy said propt•rty and all payments \Yhieh ha\e been
ntade thrrptofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall
be for-feited to the Seller as liquidated da1nages for the
non-pPrrorinance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees
H
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that the Seller may, at his option, re-enter and take
possession of said premises without legal process as in
its first and f~ormer estate, together with all improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the
said additions and improvements shall remain with the
land and become the property of the Seller, the Buyer
becoming .at once a tenant at will of the Seller. It is
agreed that time is the essence of this agreement." Exhibit 1.
Taxes on said premises, for the year designated, were
as follows:
Amount
Year
Due
1950
$659.28 1/6 for
$ 109.88
two months
1951
734.08
734.08
1952
652.63
652.63
1953
671.01
671.01
1954
719.42
719.42
1955
786.61
786.61
$3673.63
See Exhibit 11.
EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO PAYMENTS
Defendants paid to plaintiffs pursuant to said Uniform Real Estate Contract the following sums on the
date indicated, (Exhibit 11, which was stipulated to as
the payments made by all parties hereto at the initial
hearing):
$10,700.00
Oct. 25, 1950
655.00
Dec. 5, 1950
Jan. 1, 1951
Feb. 8, 1951

655.00
655.00
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Mar. 8,1951
Apr. 12, 1951
May 10, 1951
June 13, 1951
July 12, 1951
Aug. 13, 1951
Sept. 14, 1951
Oct. 11, 1951
Nov. 1, 1951
Nov. 19, 1951
Dec. 18, 1951

655.00
655.00
655.00
655.00
600.00
600.00
600.00
625.00
49.00
600.00
600.00

Jan. 23, 1952
Mar. 1, 1952
Apr. 1, 1952
May 10, 1952
June 20, 1952
Aug.1, 1952
Sept.5,1952
Oct. 4, 1952
Nov. 12, 1952
Nov. 29, 1952

600.00
600.00
600.00
600.00
600.00
6:27.00
455.00
455.00
455.00
254.64

Jan. 12, 1953
Feb. 7, 1953
1\far. 6, 1953
Apr. 7, 1953
l\Iay 7, 1953
June 1:2, 1953
July 7, 1953
Aug·. 1~, 1953
'"
Sept.l7,1953
NoY. 1, 1953
Nov. ~s, 1953

455.00
455.00
455.00
455.00
455.00
455.00
455.00
455.00
455.30
455.00
5:21.00

.T.an. 6, 1954

455.00
455.00

Feb. 23, 1954

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
Apr. 6, 1954
May 24, 1954
June 28, 1954
July 31, 1954
Sept. 4, 1954
Nov. 28, 1954

455.00
455.00
300.00
455.00
500.00
500.00

Oct. 9, 1954
Jan.10,1955
Mar.8, 1955
Apr. 8, 1955
May 10,1955
June 4,1955
July 7, 1955
Aug. 15, 1955
Oct. 6, 1955
Oct. 31, 1955

455.00
460.00
444.24
259.50
350.00
360.00
360.00
258.44
360.00
260.00

Paid to plaintiffs ____________ $36, 787.56
At the time of the purchase of said properties, Mr.
Judd paid to the County Treasurer, Salt Lake County,
the sum of $109.88 on the taxes on said properties for
the year 1950, which w.as defendants' proportionate share
and defendants are entitled to a credit in said amount
upon said contract (page 2'4). Defendants had made a
total payment to plaintiffs pursuant to said contract
on said November 30, 1955, the sum of $36,787.56, including the down payment. N·o payments were made
after said date. As of said November 30, 1955, defendants were under obligation to have paid to plaintiffs
pursuant to s.aid contract the sum of $3,673.63 in taxes,
plus 60 monthly payments in the sum of $600.00 each,
per month, or $36,000.00, plus the. down payment of
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$10,700.00, constituting a total obligation as of said November 30, 1955, of $54,699.85 (Exhibit 22). The sum of
$36,787.56 had been paid· as of said date and nothing
was ever paid or tendered thereafter. This constituted
an arrearage on November 30, 1955, on the part of the
defendants, in the sum of $13,586.07.
During this period of time when defendants were
defaulting on their payments on said contract, plaintiffs
were under obligation to maintain their purchase contract
from Burge and make monthly payments in the sum
of $300.00 per month.

E\TIDENCE

RELATI\~

TO NOTICES

On :.\larch 14, 1955, plaintiffs caused to be served
upon each of defendants a XOTICE TO REI~-STATE
THE TER:.\IS OF THE CON"TRA.CT TO Pl~RCHASE
BY P A Y~IEXT OF ALL DELIXQl"'EXT .A.~IOl...NTS
DUE .A.ND 0'\TIXG OR FORFEIT ALL RIGHTS
l~XDER SAID COXTR . .\.CT AS PRO\"'IDED THEREIN
FOR FORFEITURE. Said notice set forth that defendants \rere in arrears in the sm11 of $10,734.64 and stated
in part a.s follo\\Ts :
... X otiel~ is hereby giYen that if you claim any
rights under said contract, notwithstanding your
ngrPPlnent in \Yriting to surrender said property
to ~eller if the delinquent installn1ents are not
paid \rithin a re.asonable ti1ne, na1nely 30 days,
YOU nre herehv notified that said contract of sale
i~ to hP and i~· ter1ninated and cancelled by reason
of your defaults and refusal to pay and by reason
of your rPjeetion of the offer to reinstate said
eontract." (Exhibit ~).
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On May 20, 1955, sixty-six days after said Notice
to Reinstate had been served on defendants and after
no p.ayment or tender of any nature had been made on
said arrearage, plaintiffs caused to be served upon each
of said defendants a NOTICE OF FORFEITURE,
NOTICE OF TENANCY AT WILL, AND NOTICE
TO VACATE PREMISES WITHIN FIVE DAYS
AFTER THE SERVICE OF NOTICE. Said notice set
forth therein that defendants were notified and required
to pay the delinquent installments within "thirty days"
or ,a "reasonable time"; that defendants did not pay
said delinquent installments and in fact did not pay the
monthly installments due during said period to reinstate
said contract pursuant to said notice dated March 11,
1955, and defendants utterly failed to perform the terms
of s.aid instrument. Said notice further stated that if
defendants held over that an unlawful detainer action
would be instituted against defendants. Exhibit 3.
Defendants failing to comply with either of said
notices in any manner, plaintiffs instituted an action in
the District Court of S.alt Lake County, State of Utah,
on the first day of June 1955, against defendant and
prayed that:
a. Plaintiffs be adjudged to be the owners of the
real property described in said contract and be entitled
to immediate possession thereof;
b. That defendant be adjudged guilty of unlawful
detainer of said premises from and since May 26, 1955,
and that plaintiffs have issued by this court a writ of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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restitution whereby defendants shall be evicted from said
premises, together with their goods and chattels, and that
said premis·es be restored to the possession of plaintiffs;
and
c. That plaintiffs recover from defendants damages
for unlawful detainer in the amount of $600.00 per month
trebled (or at the rate of $20.00 per day trebled) during
the time defendants shall withhold possession from plaintiffs; and
d. That plaintiffs recover their costs and disbursements herein incurred, and such other relief as may be
appropriate in the premises, including a reasonable attorney's fee. (Pages 4 and 5.)

E"YIDEXCE RELATI\""E TO REPOSSESSION
Issue ,,~as joined by the filling of an answer and
counterclaim of defendants on June 20, 1955, and a deInand for trial certificate .and order were filed.
In September, 1955, before the Honorable David T.
Le"~is, one of the judges of said District Court, a pretrial
''Tas held and at said tin1e and place, namely six months
after service of said X otiee to Reinstate the Terms of
thP c~ontract~ plaintiffs adYised said court that plaintiff
i~ Hinterested purely in the satisfaction of the contract
and prerPrably by the contract being satisfied by the
pa~rntPnt. rathPr than forfeiture, and there is no desire
on hPhalf of the plaintiff to cause the property to be
forr('itPd if payn1ent can be n1ade in any 1nanner. (page
~t.)

(ln NoYl'Illhl'r 30, 1955, t"\YO 1nonths after said pre-

t rinJ, ~nid Honorable DnYid T. Lewis called up said case
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for trial and again said statement of the position of
plaintiffs relative to forfeiture was made. During the
course of said trial, said Judge Lewis called counsel to
his chambers and advise·d that the court felt the matter
should be settled and that an agreement might be worked
out. It was thought a settlement had been reached and
stipulations made and the hearing was discontinued.
Said stipulation was never reduced to writing but parts
of the same were carried out including the plaintiffs
taking possession of said properties and operating the
same as of December 1, 1955. Defendants remained in
the apartment defendants were occupying on said
premises without payment of anything until March, 1956.
On March 5, 1957, the Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr.,
one of the judges of said District Court, called said
case up for trial and again said court was advised that:
"Plaintiff is interested purely in the satisfaction of the contract and preferably by the contract being satisfied by the p·ayment rather than
forfeiture. That there is no desire on beh.alf of
the plaintiff to cause the property to be forfeited
if payment can be made in any manner." (Page
41).
Said plaintiff, Mr. Peck, further testified .at the trial
as follows:
"Q. And is it your desire that this property
and these premises be turned over to you pursuant to a writ of restitution~
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. And if you could get your money out
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
of this contract you would be glad to let them
remain there, is that right~

"A. Yes sir.
"Q. .- And yon are asking that the Court order
that the contract, this uniform real estate contract
the subject of this action be terminated and b~
declared null and void~

"A. y es Sir.
.
"Q. And you are asking that you be awarded
treble damages for the unlawful detainer of these
premises~

"A. Yes sir." (Page 64)
E\7 IDENCE RELATIVE TO CONDITION OF
PROPERTY '':HEX SOLD _._.\_XD RETlX{XED

Said premises ''Tere in "very good condition." (Page
81). There \Yere no roofs leaking, no plaster falling off
the ceilings, the paper and painting ··"-ere all in good
condition" and it "Tas Hall in good condition." (Pages 80
and 81). These facts are uncontroverted in the evidence.
In Dece1nber, 1955, as the properties \Yere returned .and
\vere again lmder the 1nanage1nent of :Jir. Peck, his manager, ~[r~. J an1es Egan, testified that the conditions
of the propertic·s \Vere .. terribly run down,~~ that the
pla~tPr \Ya~ off ~o1ne of the ceilings, the place \vas badly
i11 nPPd ol' paint, .and that the pre1nises \vere not in as
good eondi tion "·hpn she returned in Decen1ber, 1955,
a.~ t1H\r \Vt\rP \rhen shP lt.:\ft in 1950. l\Irs. Egan further
tPHt i f'iPd that the pren1ises "·ere being i1nproved from
the titne shP reentered: that i1nproYe1nents "Tere 1nade
at. 1~1 and 1:2:~, a ne"r roof \vas put on the four units on
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Edison Street, that Mr. Peck has put congoleum on and
has furnished paint for people to decorate and fix up
their .apartments and that some of the apartments are
in better condition than they were vvhen 1\fr. Peck took
over the management again and that in the over-all the
apartments were in better condition than they were when
plaintiffs first took them back; there having been new
pipes in the heating system and that the furnace had
been repaired (Pages 82 and 83).
Three or four thousand dollars in repairs had been
put on said premises between the time Mr. Peck took the
properties back and Mr. Ashton appraised them (Page
77).
EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO FAIR MARKET
VALUE OF PROPERTY AT TIME OF
RETURN OF PROPERTIES
Edward M. Ashton, the only witness c.alled by any
of the parties to testify as to the fair market value of
the property, who had been appraising properties for
a period of thirty years for life insurance companies
and for private individuals, running into thousands of
c.ases and a member of the Association of Real Estate
Brokers and also of the Real Estate Appraisal Organization of America, a former president of the Chamber of
Commerce ·of Salt Lake City and twice president of the
Real Estate Board of the city and once of the State
of Utah, made an appraisal from "two angles," "First,
by adding up the value of the ground separate from the
improvements and putting the improvements separately,
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
and then I have taken it on the basis ·of the economic
value of the property, based on its operation, gross
income and expenses, and the net, and I have arrived
at it in the following manner." (Page42 and 43).
Mr. Ashton testified that:
". . . I got $50,000.00 and I figured that that
would be obtainable from the property if it was
kept in pretty good shape. But in going through
the property I found very serious conditions there.
Some places where the roof was leaking badly and
wasn't plastered down. Then I took occasion last
Saturday to employ a man who is an expert
painter that had been in the business for 25 or
30 years and he checked it all over and he found
it would cost $11,000.00 to repaint the interior
of the houses and the exterior so that made a
serious situation. So my judgment is that as of
today the building in its present condition probably wouldn't be worth any more than about
$40,000.00." (Page 44).
He further stated that from the economic standpoint
the property is worth today about $40,000.00. "But it
has a potential greater than that," and explained that
HThe potential 'Yould be this. That if ii was properly
improved they " . . ould have a greater income than ever
has been obtained for it~ because over a period of years
thPy haYPn't obtained as n1ueh fron1 rental as I indicated
with 1ny figures. But if it " . . ere properly operated and
thP grounds fixed up, ,y}urh have been allowed to go
to ])(~]ter ~kelter it 1nakes a different situation there," and
explained h''ren as of today in its present condition it
wouldn't be more than about $40,000.00" was stated in
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reply to the question as to the value of the ground and
the value of the improvements on the property itself.
(Pages 44 and 45)
In explaining how he arrived at these figures, he
stated " ... in checking the property over very carefully
I made .an analysis of it, showing the location of each
building on the ground and compared that with what
they call the Sanborn Map. That shows, it is a map of
all of the properties in Salt Lake City; where they are
located, what they .are, and I find that shown in the
back of the apartments, especially 121 and 123. There
were framed porches down there which were gone and
the building has the appearance of no protection from
fire. I find probably it needs a new furnace and there
is pro b.ably $1,000.00 expense there and then a lot of
things I have discovered. The building in the back of
125 that has since been removed and the bricks still on
the premises not removed."
In the other approach, Mr. Ashton testified that
from the front foot basis "That gave me $25,815.00 total
valuation of the land, .. then I figured the total of all
of these buildings $29,050, or a total of $54,863.00 from
the standpoint of summing the property up but from the
economic approach I figured a lesser figure." Counsel
for the defendants then asked Mr. Ashton, "Well you
would actually come close to the figure of $50,000.00
in one case and $54,800.00 in the other~" And in reply,
Mr. Ashton stated, "Yes. And the thing that made me
come down to 40 is the-" and counsel for the defendants
then interrupted Mr. Ashton .and did riot permit hin1
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to finish when .he started to explain why the value was
$40,000.00. Mr. Ashton did state that "I would say, Your
Honor, when you get down to putting it down to market
value it would sell pretty close to 40 to $50,000.00. None of
us are smart enough to pin it down to a certain sum
of money." (Page 52).
Mr. Peck, on cross examination, testified that Mr.
Chapman told him (pure hearsay) that he appraised it
at $61,700.00 (Page 75). Mr. Peck said that Martin
Turner's appraisal "was $65,000." (Page 76). In reply
to the question of whether or not the other gentlemen
(~fr. Chapman and Mr. Turner) were certified appraisers
he indicated "I think Not" but that he did not know as
to their qualifications. :Jir. Peck stated that he was
advised to get a certified appraisal of said properties
and that was the reason that he engaged the services
of nir. Ashton (Page 76).

E\"'IDEN"CE REL ...-\_TlY'"E TO HF~IR R-EXTAL
\"'"ALt'"E~~ OF SAID PREJ\IISES
:Jlr. Ashton in sun1n1arizing the operation and
rental8 obtained fron1 the pre1nises as reflected by the
state1nents of the parties, testified as follows:
.. That if it ,,~as properly in1proved they would
ha.Yt. . a greater inco1ne than even has been obtained
for it, heeanst. . oYer a period of years they haven't
obtaint. . d a8 1nueh fron1 rental as I have indicated
"Tith HlY figures. But if it "~ere properly operated
and the grounds fixed up, "\Yhich have been allowed
to go to h~lter skelter it 1nakes a different situation there." (Page 44)
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Mr. Sheffield, counsel for defendants advised the
court that "we ... have in our hands produced income
from the property of $51,151.49. That is the income
.alone," and explained "That includes ~1r. Judd's apartment at $40.00 a month, since it was not a furnished
apartment for 60 months." Mr. Judd testified that $48,871.49 is the total receipts on people we give receipts to
on all of these apartments and testified that $40.00
per month, which I figure is the fair rental value :of
that ,apartment" (the one which he occupied) for the
period of time until he surrendered the premises to
Mr. Peck, constituted a total rental of said $51,151.49,
though Mr. Judd did not actually move from his apartment until the following March, 1956.
PLEADINGS OF PLAINTIFFS
Plaintiffs prayed:
a.

Plaintiffs be adjudged owners of said real
property and be entitled to immediate possession thereof ;

b.

Defendants be adjudged guilty of unlawful
detainer of premises from and since May 26,
1955, and that plaintiffs have issued by court
a writ of restitution whereby defendants shall
be evicted from premises, trogether with their
goods and chattels, and premises be restored
to plaintiffs;

c.

Plaintiffs recover from defendants damages
for unlawful detainer in amount of $600.00
per month trebled during time defendants
withhold premises from plaintiffs; and
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d.

Plaintiffs. recover costs and disbursements,
including reasonable attorney's fee and such
other relief as appropTiate.

PLEADINGS OF DEFENDANTS
Defendants set forth five separate and distinct defenses and two counterclaims. The first defense was that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action. This
defense was abandoned and was never presented for
argument. The second defense was that plaintiff consented to a change in the terms of said agreement with
respect to the amount of payment per month and allowing
defendants to make lesser payments. K o evidence was
presented on this defense and no argument was made
and this defense was abandoned. The third defense was
that plaintiffs did not own, nor were able to convey
ti tie. K o evidence \Yas presented as to the inability of
plaintiffs to convey or that defendants were in the
position to demand conve~~anee and this defense was
abandoned. The fourth defense w.as that plaintiffs cannot
give l)Ossession or quiet enjoyn1ent of nor ph~~sical title
to said 1>reinises. X o eYidence \Yas presented to support
said defense and it 1nust have been abandoned. The
fifth d~fense "~as that by the aeceptance of the paylllPnts that plaintiffs l1ad acquiesced in a change in the
paytnents for a. long period of tn11e and that there was
a rPlianee on said aequie~cence. X o eYidence or argument
"·as n1ade on said defense and the sa1ne "~.as abandoned.
The First Counterelain1 "Tas that there "Tas an express and in1plied "·arranty that said premises \vere
in a fit and proper .and habitable condition for occuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pancy as rental p,roperties and apartments and that
defendants were required to expend approximately $30,000.00 to repair the same to the extent necessary to
pass Bo.ard of Health requirements in order that said
properties could be continued as rental properties. No
evidence was presented as to Board of Health requirements and defendant testified "it was a suitable place as
far as rentable building." (P.age 55). Exhibit 23 of
defendants shows the income rental on said apart1nents
and on each the income appears constant. No argument
was made as to .any breach of warranty and said counter
claim based up,on breach was abandoned.
The Second Counterclaim was that Pecks were seeking to enforce a penalty and forfeiture against defendant
which is totally and completely unjustified, and that
defendants should have returned to the1n the value and
amount paid into said plaintiffs .and value of said improvements in said property, over and beyond the reasonable rental value of s.aid property, which sum amounts to
$42,521.50; and that enforcement of the forfeiture provisions herein would allow an unconscionable and exhorbitant recovery to plaintiffs, far in excess of any
loss or damage suffered by them, and that said provisions
should not be enforced.
Upon the Second Counterclaim and upon said basis
only was the issue drawn.
FINDINGS OF COURT
The court made and entered its findings of fact,
findings, inter alia, which found: That a total payment
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was made by defendants to plaintiffs pursuant to said
contract, including the down payment was $36,787.56,
and that there was due and owing on said contract as
of the 30th day of November, 1955, a total sum of
$54,699.85, and an arrearage of the sum of $13,586.07.
To these findings, no exception is taken by the defendants. The court further found that defendants collected
as rentals on said premises during the period defendants
were in possession, namely from K ovember 1, 1950, to
and including November 30, 1955, the sum of $48,751.49,
and had the use and occupancy of an apartment which
was used and occupied by defendants as their own
d\\Telling which had a reasonable rental value of $50.00
per month during said five year period or a \alue of
$3,000.00, constituting a total rental received by defendants from said premises of $51,751.49. These findings
are based on the testimony of defendant (Pages 100-104).

DECREE OF COURT
Tn the decree of the court, plaintiffs were adjudged
the o"Tners of said property and entitled to immediate
po~~e~Rion
guilt~,.

thereof .and that defendants

of unla"Tful detainer

thereof~

"~ere

adjudged

plaintiffs 'Yere en-

titlPd to a "Trit of restitution and defendants 'Yere not
Pntit IPd to any relief on their counterclailus and have
no equity in said property or prenlise~ and that said

eont raet i8 null and yoid and ''"'holly ineffective for .any
purpo~e \vhat8ot~ver ~md should be cancelled and is cancelh\d and ter1ninatcd (Pages 106-107).
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APPEAL GROUNDS
The defendants appeal upon the following "Statement of Points"
1. The court erred in its ruling that the property
has only a value of $40,000.00.
2. The trial court erred in excluding defendants
evidence as to improvements and maintenance costs.
3. The trial court erred in declaring a forfeiture
and allowing the plaintiff to retain all of the monies
paid in by the defendants as liquidated damages, without
regard to the excluded evidence.
4. If the contract is null and void as decreed by the
court, then the trial court erred in not requiring a refund
to the defendants on the contract.
5. The fact situation here involved did not justify
forfeiture under the law of the State of Utah.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS FINDING DEFENDANTS
WERE IN DEFAULT, FORFEITURE WAS AGREEMENT OF
PARTIES IN EVENT OF DEFAUI.JT, LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IN AMOUNT A WARDED WAS PURSUANT 'TO
CONTRACT, LIQUIDATED DAMAGES WERE NOT UNCONSCOUNABLE AND WERE IN FACT LESS THAN DEFENDANTS TOOK FROM PROPERTIES, AND FORFEITURE
BASED ON ACTS OF DEFENDANTS AND JUSTIF'IED
UNDER LAW OF STATE OF UTA.H.

Staten1ent of Points 3 and 5 of defendants and Point
I of Plaintiffs will be discussed in the following manner:
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a. Was the forfeiture of 'the rights in the property
proper under the terms of the contract· and

'

b. Was the allowing the plaintiff to retain all of the
monies paid in by the defendants as liquidated damages,
without regard to the excluded evidence, proper.
The provision of the contract relative to forfeiture
and liquidated damages reads as follows :
"In the event of a failure to comply with the
terms hereof the Buyer, upon failure to make any
payments when the same shall become due, or
'vithin thirty days thereafter, the Seller shall, at
his option, be released from all obligations in law
and equity to convey said property and all payments which ha-ve been made theretofore on this
contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the
Seller as liquidated damages for the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that
the Seller 1nay, at his option, re-enter and take
possession of said premises "ithout legal process
as in its first and forn1er estate, together with all
in1proven1ents and additions made by the Buyer
thereon, .and the said additions and iinprovements
shall re1nain 'Yith the land and become the prop·
erty of the Seller~ the Buyer becoming at once a
tenant at "~in of the Seller. It is agreed that time
is the essence of this agreement.~~ Exhibit 1.
n.

It n1ust be ren1e1nbered that the plaintiffs took
the propPrti('S OYt'r on Dece1nber 1~ 1955, 'Yith the full
<·on sent of tht\ derendants t•xcept the ap.art1nent in W'"hich
,Judds "~PrP rrsiding and continued to reside until n1arch~
1!)!)(). Th0r0 "~as no court order but a stipulation of
set tl P1uen t "·as in the offing and all thn t is in the record
is that thP plaintiffs took over the 1nanagement of the
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properties on December 1, 1955. The properties were
turned back over to plaintiffs by defendants. The taking
over and repossession was not over the protests of defendants but with their acquiescence.
No question has been or is being raised relative to the
right of defendants to retain possession of the p·roperties.
The return of the property to the defendants is not being
sought nor argued. The uncontroverted testimony of the
plaintiff is that there was no desire on the part of the
plaintiff to cause a forfeiture in the event plaintiff could
but obtain his rights under the contract. Notice to reinstate the contract was given in March, 1955; two months
later another notice of the termination of the contract and
the declaration of the creation of a tenancy at will was
served in May, 1955; and, in September, 1955, six months
after the first notice at the time of the pretrial, the defendants vvere again advised that there was no desire to
require .a forfeiture and opportunity was given defendants to make plaintiffs whole and they would thereby
become whole, then on November 30, 1955, two months
after the pretrial and eight months after the initial notice,
a hearing 'vas commenced and the hearing was terminate.d
to afford defendants every opportunity to salvage anything salvageable defendants might have in said contract
and properties.
At the time the first notice was served on defendants
to reinstate their contract, the defendants were some
$10,734.64 in arrears. Defendants knew that during the
time defendants were defaulting, plaintiffs were required
to keep in full force and effect plaintiffs contract to purSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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chase these same premises. Plaintiffs were really being
damaged in having to maintain payments on their contract of purchase when defendants were defaulting on
their contract.
In the early case of Rose v. Garn, 56 Utah 533, 191
Pac. 645, the Supreme Court, State of Utah, stated:
"No court has ever held that the parties may
not agree between themselves as to the measure
of damages that shall be sustained upon the breaching of a contract by either party."
It would seem that there could be no question of the
right of the plaintiffs to re-enter and take possession of
said premises when defendants were $10,734.64 in arrears
at the time of the giving of the notice to reinstate the
contract and plaintiffs did not take possession until eight
months later during which time defendants had the opportunity to salvage their interest in said properties;
after defendants had collected some $51,751.49 in rentals
from s.aid premises and had only paid to plaintiffs a total
sun1 of $36,787.56, including down pa~J.nent, taxes, interest
and principal; "~hen the properties 'Yere Hterribly run
do"~n~' "~hen the properties 'Yere tali:en over by plaintiffs
in December, 1955, and "~hen said properties "were in
YPry good condition·· "~hen the sa1ne "~ere sold to defendants aeeording to the uncontroYerted testimony of ~Irs.
l~~ga.n ~ t hP 111a nagPr of said properties at the tiine of the
~al(\ .and iuunediately follo"~ing the return of the propertiPs to l\1 r. 1\~ek. There 'Yas sin1ply no other "~ay out
n~ l\1 r. Ashton stated that the grounds .. haYe been allowed
to go hPlter skPlter~' and therefore .. over a period of years
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
they haven't obtained as much from rental as I indicated
·with my figures. But if it were propertly operated and
the grounds fixed up" there would have been greater
income. Plaintiffs could wait no longer and permit the
premises to continue to degenerate and were compelled
to retake the premises and this w.as done with the acquiescence of defendants.
b. This court has previously had the problem of considering whether the application of a liquidated damages
clause in a contract is actually liquidated damages or a
penalty. In the case of Cooley v. Call, 61 Utah 203, 211 P.
977, speaking through Justice Thurman, the court stated:
"It does seem to the writer that here was a
candid deliberate attempt on the part of the contracting parties to fix and determine a measure
of damages which should operate as an exclusive
remedy in the event that the vendee should default
in subsequent payments. If the damages stipulated
in the contract were either inadequate or radically
excessive, as compared with the probable damage§
that could be foreseen by the parties when the
contract was executed, there might be some reason
for contending that the damages stipulated were
not intended as an exclusive remedy, but such was
not the case, as appeared from the record. Upon
the execution of the contract, November 25, 1919,
defendants paid plaintiffs $1,850. During the next
year they paid one-half of the interest on a $6,000
mortgage at 6 percent per annum amounting to
$180, and paid taxes on the property for the year
1920, which must have amounted to at le.ast $100.
As to the exact amount the findings were indefinite. In any event the defendants paid taxes and
interest in at least the sum of $280, which added
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to the initial payment of $1,850, gives a result of
$2,130. The final payment was to be made December 1, 1921, or within two years and five days from
the execution of the contract. So that it could be
readily foreseen by the parties to the contract at
the time it was executed just what plaintiffs' damages would probably be when the last payment became due, even if defendants should default in
every subsequent payment provided for by the
contract. A simple mathematical calculation demonstrates that the $1,850 paid by defendants
amounted to at least 10 per cent per annum on
the purchase price of the property, of which
amount plaintiffs were absolutely assured because
it was paid in advance. Can it be said in the light
of these facts that the damages stipulated in the
contract \Yere so excessive, on the one hand, or so
inadequate, on the other, that it could not have
been intended as the amount of damages to which
plaintiffs "-ould be entitled in case defendants
defaulted in subsequent payments? \\"""e think not."
Statement of Points X o. 5 is that the fact situation
here inYolved did not justify forfeiture under the law of
the State of l 1 tah.
'\That are the facts in the instant case' There ·was a
rlo\\"D p.ay1nent required of $35,000.00 on the original listill~ \\·hiclt \\·a~ reduced to the sun1 of $10,700.00 under the
con t raet aetna lly Ina de. There "-as a require1nent of
$600.00 pPr 1nont.h pnyn1ent on the contract plus ta."X:es~
or a total of $7~:.?00.00 per year plus the taxes "'"hich ayeragPd. nhont $700.00 pf~r ye.ar or less than $8,000.00 per
yPnr on the eontra.et. Ho\\~ 1nurh \ras collected by defendantH a:4 rPntnls during the fiye year period, \Yhieh !lr.
A:4hton :4:1 id eould be inrrensed \Yith good operation and
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management~

The sum of $51,151.49 was actually collected in rentals during the five year period, or a sum $10,230.29 annually, and the sum of $852.52 was actually collected monthly as rentals on the average .and the monthly
payment due plaintliffs was the sum of $600.00 plus the
taxes. The difference between what defendants collected
as rentals ($51,151.49) and the amount paid plaintiffs
($36,787.56 including taxes) is $14,363.93. At the time
defendants purchased said premises the contract prices
vvas $75,000.00, which was the fair market value as of that
date because there was no force or pressure claimed.
Mr. Ashton's testimony at the time of the trial was:
":r.•**So my jdugment is that as of today the
building in its present condition prob.ably wouldn't
be worth any more than about $40,000.00." (Page
44)
and 1\frs. Egan testified that: since she returned between
the time that Mr. Peck retook the premises and when Mr.
Ashton made his appraisal that:
"*** The property has been improving, other
than the roof has been put on .and Mr. Peck has
put congoleum on. He has furnished paint for
people for several places for them to do their
decorating and fixing up their apartments." (Page
82')
And Mr. Peck testified that he had expended some $4,000.00 since taking said premises back. (Page 77)
In the instant case, the monthly payments arranged
and provided for by the contract from experience, even
with poor management and permitting the property to
become in a state of disrepair, were less than the amount
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to be paid on the contract and therefore were in no sense
unconscionable and exorbitant. There was an average of
more than $250.00 per month cushion for expenses in
operation. Certainly Peck could not be expected to assume the responsibility for the management and operation during the period J udds had said properties. There
was no penalty in this case, as in the Western Macaroni
Mfg. Co. v. Fiore, 47 Utah 108, 151 P. 984, but actually
a surrender of less than defendants had collected on the
premises as rentals was being forfeited. See the cases of
Dopp v. Richards, 43 Utah 332, 135 P. 98, and Cooley v.
Call, supra, wherein this court went into detail to determine if the liquidated damages were compensatory for
the injury sustained or were penal in nature. In the instant case, the amount being collected monthly exceeded
the amount he was required to pay on the contract. As
stated in Bramwell ln'C. Co. v. Uggla, 81 l~tah 85, 16 P.
2d 913, Justice Elias Hansen speaking for the unanimous
court stated :
"This court is committed to the doctrine that,
where the parties to a contract stipulate the
a1nount of liquidated damages that shall be paid
in rase of a breach, such stipulation is, as a
general rule, enforceable, if the amount stipulated
is not disproportionate to the damages actually
sustained. A different rule .applies "~here the
a1nount stipulated is oppressiy·e, unconscionable,
or i~ in the nature of a penalty rather than damages actually sustained.~~
In thP ea~e of Croft v. Jensen, 86 lltah 13, 40 P. 2d
l!lS, the 8l'l1t\r "~as tendered all the n1oney due and owing
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on the contract prior to the commencement of the suit, the
amount being $200.00 on a contract upon which $6,500 had
been paid. Of course, no forfeiture was gr.anted. In the
instant case, plaintiff at every step of the proceeding
stated that plaintiffs did not desire a forfeiture but only
what the contract called for and only asked for forfeiture
because of the inability of defendants to perform. There
was still some $54,699.85 due and owing on the contract
and had the property a marketable value as contended by
defendants, defendants could have sold said properties
during the many months .after the notice to reinstate the
contract and before judgment, as plaintiffs on the day of
trial offered to withdraw the action if plaintiffs could be
but made whole, paid off the balance on the contract .and
had an equity.
In the case at bar, the purchase price was $75,000.00
and the balance due on the contr.act was $54,699.85, (Exhibit 22) at the time of the trial, which means that approximately one-third of the purchase price had been paid
on the principal. Justice Crockett, in alluding to the c.ase
of Christy v. Guild, 101 Utah 313, 121 P. 2d 401, written
for the court by Justice McDonough, in Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P. 2d 446, stated as follows:
"While they (Guilds) had paid in approximately one-third of the purchase price, they had
paid only $20 to $30 e.ach month over the period,
plus making improvements on the premises totally
$2,000. But the property had a monthly income
to them of $75.00, which exceeded the total of the
payments they had made plus their improvements.
After reviewing those facts, it was held that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'30
forfeiture provision· was not a penalty under the
rule above stated."
.
·
·Those facts are practically the same as in the instant case.
One-third of the purchase price had been paid, approximately, and the amount collected from the premises as
rentals was $51,151.49, and there had only been paid on
the contract $36,787.56.
The Reinstatement of Contracts, 339, dealing With
the question of forfeiture is cited in the brief of appellants and in said Perkins v. Spencer, supra, as stating
as follows:
"(1) An agreement, made in advance of
breach fixing the damages therefor, is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the damages
recoverable for the breach, unless

(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm
that is caused by the breach, and
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach
is one that is incapable or \ery difficult
of accurate estimation."
C~on~ider

in the instant case that Judds ,,~ere required to
pay to Peeks under the c.ontract the su1n of $600.00 per
n1onth, plus the taxes earh year, and that Judds collected
as rPntals an nYPrage of $S3:2.5~ per n1onth. Is that not
PYidPncp that the liquidated dan1ages 'Yere not intended as
a penn 1ty ·1 Plaintiffs ha Ye no quarrel 'Yith the application of the rPsta tl'HlPnt proYisions to the instant case.

AftPr reYil\\Ying the opinions of this court relative
to the has is of d~unages ordinarily recoYerable for a
breach of eont ract or excluding .. liquidated dan1ages"
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which are in fact "penalties" for a breach, Justice Crockett set forth a rule which guided the trial court in the
instant case and guided counsel in the litigation of the trial
of the case. See Perkins v. Spencer, supra. This rule is
as follows:
"The vendors are entitled to any loss occasioned them by any of these factors :
(1) Loss of any advantageous bargain;
(2) Any damage to or depreciation of the
property;
(3) Any decline in value due to change in
market value of the property not allowed
for in items no. 2 and 3 ; and
(4) For the fair rental value of the property
during the period of occupancy.
"The total of such sums should be deducted
from the total amount paid in, plus any improvements for which it would be fair to allow recovery,
and any remaining difference awarded to the
plaintiffs.''
Applying the rule set forth by this court to the instant case, the following considerations must be given:
1. Loss of an advantageous bargain. The price of
sale or bargain w.as $75,000.00. The Finding of the Court
at the time it was returned was $40,000.00.
2. Any damage to or depreciation of the property.
Mr. Ashton, a certified appraiser testified:

"*** If I capitalized that at 7% I got $50,000.00 .and I figured that that would be obtainable
from the property if it were kept in pretty good
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

shape. But in going through the property I found
very serious conditions there. Some places where
the roof was leaking badly and wasn't plastered
down. Then I took occasion last Saturday to employ a man who is an expert painter that had been
in business for 25 or 30 years and he checked it all
over and he found it would cost $11,000.00 to repaint the interior of the houses and the exterior so
that made a serious situation. So my judgment
is that as of today the building in its present condition probably wouldn't be worth more than about
$40,000.00." (Page 44)
"There were framed porches down there which
were gone and the building has the appearance of
no protection from fire. I find it probably needs
a new furnace and there is probably $1,000.00 expense there and then a lot of things I have discovered. The building in the back of 125 that has
since been removed and the bricks still on the
premises not removed." (Page 46)
On cross exan1ination as to the value of the property
from the t\\?o approaches used by Mr. Ashton and in reply
to the question of counsel for defendants.

"Q. 'V ell you would actually come close to
the figure of $50,000.00 in one ease and $54,800.00
in the other'?
A.. Yes~ and t11e tiring that made me come
down to 40 is the •:~:••'
u ..

and thPrP he \ra~ interrupted by counsel but he ,yas clear
that Ht1H' t hinp; that Inndt::' n1e conH? do'vn to 40 ~- 'Yas existent and the yalue \\Tns not $50,000 or $54,800. (Page 50)
In reply to the question of the court:
ul\lr. Ashton, there is a question I want to ask.
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Having in mind when a person not under compulsion to buy and one not under compulsion to sell,
what would you say the reasonable f.air market
value of the property is at this time~
"I would say, Your Honor, when you get down
to putting it down to market value it would sell
pretty close to 40 to $50,000.00. None of us are
smart enough to pin it down to a certain sum of
money." (Page 52)
Mrs. Berg testified that the properties were in better
condition when Mr. Ashton made his ,appraisal than when
Mr. Peck took the properties back and Mr. Peck testified
that he had expended $4,000.00 on the properties since
taking them back. This testin1ony is uncontradicted, even
by Mr. Judd, who was subsequently upon the stand.
(Pages 41-42)
3. There was no testimony that there had been any
decline in value due to change in market value of the
property not allowed for in items Nos. 1 and 2.
4. For the fair rental value of the property during
the period of occupancy.
The defendants, Judd, testified that they had income
from said properties in the sum of $51,151.49 during the
five years which they occupied the property. That was the
total rentals. (P.age 86)
Mr. Ashton testified that with better management
and proper care these rentals could have been increased.
Defendants contend that "fair rental value" as used
by the court does not mean the rentals received from the
property or wh.at the properties would rent for during
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a certain period but what the net profit was from the
rental of the properties. Mr. Judd had a clear conception
of his understanding of what was meant by "fair rental
value'' as in response to his attorney's question as to
his method of computing the rentals of his own apartment and adding those rentals to the total rentals collected from the other apartments, Mr. Judd responded:
"Well that is computed on an unfurnished
apartment at $40.00 per month, which I figure is
the fair rental value of that apartment." (Page

87)

Nothing could be more clear as to the meaning of "fair
rental value" in the mind of the defendant, Judd. The
court very aptly stated : "I believe, Mr. Sheffield, the
fair rental value means 'What does it rent for f and it
isn't a matter of, like I said to you this morning, it isn't a
matter of determining how much profit is made, because
one man might make a different profit than another
man." (Page 68) The court continued:
"Well, Mr. Sheffield of course I can only assume that the Supreme Court 1neant by the use
of the words 'fair market value' when they used
the words 'fair rental value' in the Spencer case,
I ean only assume that they intended that those
words mean their technical and legal meaning and
from the authorities that ~Ir. C.annon has cited
nnd fron1 "~hat I believe to be more authorities
along that line I have to assume the Spencer case
that that is 'vhat thev 1ueant and thev didn't mean
that fair rental vnlrie 1neant an an1~unt that was
deter1uined after all of the expenses that might
lH.} inenrred in accordance "'ith caprice of w·hat
Pver the operator n1ight be. In other words, I have
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always thought that you carne to me and you said,
'There is a house. Now wh.at is its fair market
value' I say '$75.00 a month as a fair rental value
and it's the same way with an apartment house,
or, if you want to t.ake an office building what is
the fair rental value of the Walker Bank Building,
the whole building if you were going up there to
rent it, and then seek to sublease it to tenants, what
would be its fair market value. Its fair market
value might be $25,000.00 .a month, or something
of that nature. And they wouldn't go into all the
questions of how much it costs them to operate
it or how much it is going to cost you. That is the
matter of individual shrewdness and diligence,
and so forth." (Page 72)
Corpus Juris Secondum, Volume 76, page 1168, states,
under rental, sub head rental v.alue:
"The words are said to be of some gener.al
and technical rileaning and as applied to personally
mean the hire of, the revenue from, or the value
of the use of, as applied to real estate it is the
value of the use of the land for .any purpose for
which it is adapted in the hands of a prudent and
discreet occupant on a judicious system of husbandry. That amount which in the ordinary course
of business the premises would bring or for which
they could be rented are the value as .ascertained
by proof of what the premises would rent for and
not the probable profit which might accrue, although it is said that it must depend and be measured by the extent of the property."
Words and Phrases, Permanent edition, volume 36,
page 919, reads:
"Rental value or hire of a saw mill with .a.
known capacity is the value of the use of the
same.''
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32 American Jurisprudence, s 428, reads :
"The word 'rent' derives from the Latin word
'reditus.' In ordinary use, it means the return
made by one who occupies real estate under an
express or implied contract with the owner, for
the occupation of the premises, and is defined
broadly as the compensation in money, provisions,
chattels, or services, paid or given in exchange
for the use and occupation of real estate. Thus
defined, it includes a 'royalty' based on the output
of a mine."
In the case of More v. Deyoe, 22 Hun. 208, the court
stated:
"As an item of evidence on the question of the
value of the use and occupation of the farm, it was
competent to prove what sum was actually received from it as rent. This, of course, was not
conclusive evidence of the value of the use of the
farm, but it \Yas competent endenee on the subject."
The Supreme Court of Kentucky in Alliso-n '· Cocke,
112 l(y. 212, 655 S.
3±2, 52 A.L.R. 1595, wrote:

' T·

~~This is not the ordinar' case of suit for damages. the vendees have com~ into equity for relief
ag.ain~t a forfeiture. The relief is granted them
on tern1s. They 1nust 1nake the vendors entirely
"·hole he fore tl{ey are entitled to the return of the
forfeit lllOJH~y. They eannot ask that the vendors
return to the1n Innney· "~hich has been paid out for
PX}H\nses. ••• The penalty nan1ed in the contract
fixl's thP lhnit of rt~eovery. ••

D. TT'". }·ticks, 17~ -A.\_rk. 1139,
51 ..:\.L.R. 1~87. the court considered a case

In J. ll. f_?ra.::icr et al.

!2!J2

S.,,r. :H>S,

Y.
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of the rental of farm land in which the actual price was
not previously fixed. In the note in said 51 A.L.R., the
editor wrote :
"The court observed that the correct standard
by which to measure the rent w.as the amount the
lessor could have rented the premises for during
an ordinary year, and that he was not required to
accept a less rental because of unforeseen crop
conditions which rendered the year unproductive
and unprofitable to the tenant.''
See the cases of Calve v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300
P. 2d 623; and Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2d 124, 270 P. 2d
442.
POINT II.
TRIAL ~COURT DID NOT EXCLUDE DEFENDANTS'
EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO IMPROVEMENTS AND DID NOT
ERR IN EXCLUDING DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE AS TO
MAINTENANCE.

The trial court erred in excluding defendants evidence as to improvements and maintenance costs, contends defendant in his point 2.
M.ay I quote from the record the statement of counsel for defendants and the rulings of the court: (See page
73)
"~fR.

SHEFFIELD : Well the reason I raised
that at this time, Your Honor, is this: That if
we're not in a position to deduct from the
total income, which apparently would be the
fair rental figure, the expenses of maintaining the property then the net income will
make no difference and if that is the case then
we couldn't reduce the rental value of the
property below the figure which the property
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actually produces. Now if that is the case then
under the Spencer case I think that Your
Honor has resolved the case regardless of the
factual dispute between us. If this figure is
the fair rental value it exceeds the amount,
the total amount which we have paid and if
that is the case"THE COURT: In other words you have received
more than the fair rental than you have expended on the property over the period of
time and you're not entitled to a credit.
"MR. SHEFFIELD : Well it comes out, Your
Honor, that we have paid in under our figures,
we have paid in $36,933.82. We have claimed
permanent improvements of $15,845.33, making the total of $52,799.15. In the two figures
then $51,151.49 and $52,779.15leaves less than
$1,000 and, of course, Mr. Peck is entitled to
the benefit of his bargain which is the aspect
of the case.
''THE COURT: ,,~hich could run as high as
25 to $35,000.00.
"MR. SHEFFIELD : Well under the very best
evidence that "~e can put on it only has to be
$1,000.00 in order to "ipe us out.
'~THE COl"~RT:

Yes.

"1\fR.. BIIEFFIELD: . A.nd that being the case
n1n~~be l~1n anticipating by one "~itness I

think that as soon as l\Ir. Peck is through w1ry
l\lr. Cannon 'vould rest and then I would put
on 1\lr. Judd to establish these other facts and
that is 'vhere I an1 stopped. So 'vith that in
lllind f think 'Ye ltaYe finished the case and
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about all I could do is to make an offer of
proof at that point in respect to the improvements and then we will just have to test that
question out." (Pages 73-7 4)
Continuing on page 89; after an objection to the admission of testimony relative to maintenance costs:
"MR. SHEFFIELD: Well, now, Your Honor, that
brings me to the exact point that I was suggesting, that so f.ar as we're concerned now
that ends the lawsuit because we can't win it
now.
"'THE COURT: Yes.
"MR. SI-IEFFIELD: I have some additional evidence I want to put in, that of improvements,
but I see no point in spending the time of the
Court and counsel on an issue that won't make
any difference to the outcome of this lawsuit
.as it now stands. And I was going to make
an offer of proof as to what those things are,
then if it has to be, if that issue later has to
be tried it can be tried. (Pages 89-90)
Continuing on page 92 :
"THE COURT: The point I make is this. I don't
want the record to show that you are shut
off from proving improvements and cre.ate
an error in this record for that reason.
"MR. SHEFFIELD: No. No, Your Honor, I would
not want the record to carry any such connotation whatsoever. The only point I was trying to make w.as if Your Honor's ruling with
respect to maintenance is correct then if we
prove all of the improvements that we claim
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we would fall short of the Perkins--Spencer
case.
"THE COURT: Yes, I want the record to show
that. I don't want it to show that you are
being shut off here from proving improvements.
"MR. SHEFFIELD: No, Your Honor. I understand that." (Pages 92-93)
From the record, it is clear that the court did not exclude any proffer of proof relative to improvements. The
introduction of evidence as to operation costs and maintenance were excluded as not being an element of "fair
rental value" as conceived in the Perkins-Spencer case,
supra. If they were considered an element, the court
would have to establish itself as manager of each business under forfeiture. l~nder such circumstances, the
court would eertainJ~~ apply the rule that where parties
to an action have reduced a difficult unascertainable
value to a liquidated figure and the parties have by written agreement arrived at said reasonable figure of liquidated damages then and in that ease the court is not
going to reforn1 the contract to substitute its judgment
for that of the parties previously ascertained.
POINT III.
EVIDENCE SUSTAINS FINDING THAT PROPERTIES
INVOLVED HAD A REASONABLE MARKET VALUE OF
$40,000.00, AT THE TIME PLAINTIFFS TOOK OVER ACTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTIES FROl\I DEFENDANTS.

tl1 P

lTnder thP Stnte1nent of Fact and particularly under
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titled FACTS IN EVIDENCE AS TO FAIR MARKET
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF RETURN OF PROPERTIES the facts of the case are set
forth in considerable detail. Mr. Ashton came to a higher
value for the properties in both of his methods of computation but when he applied the computations to the condition of the properties then he reduced the value by the
$11,000.00 it would cost to repaint the premises, and in
addition he noted that the heating systen1 would need a
thousand dollars for repairs. This did not include the
necessary improvements in fire protection, repairing the
roofs of the leaks and replastering. It should be noted
that the appraisal of Mr. Ashton was after plaintiffs had
re-entered and put more than $4,000.00 in maintenance
upon the premises. There are two hearsay statements by
Messrs. Chapman and Turner, neither of whom were
called to testify, and the qualifications of the same were
unknown to Mr. Peck, who testified that he obtained a
certified .appraiser in order to receive a competent appraisal. l'Jaturally, the court did not give much credence
to hearsay statements of unknown witnesses. (Pages
74-76). Mr. Chapman was subpoenaed as a witness for
defendants but he was never c.alled to testify.
POINT IV.
COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT REQUIRING PLAINTIFFS TO REFUND TO DEFENDANTS ALL MONIES PAID
TO PLAINTIFFS BY DEFENDANTS ON CONTRACT TERMINATED BY DEFENDANTS BY REASON OF DEFAULT OF
DEFENDANTS.
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Defendants proved that the rentals collected on said
properties were $51,151.49 during the time defendants
occupied properties. (P~ge 86)
Plaintiffs proved that there was a contract and that
there was due and owing on said contract the sum of
$54,699.85 (Exhibit 22) at the time the property was returned to plaintiffs ; that defendants were in arrears
$13,586.07, as of said date; that the properties were in a
deplorable state with leaking roofs, buildings needing
$11,000.00 in painting just to get them in shape; heating
system in need of repair ; knocked down building with
bricks and debris left lying on the premises; back porches
removed and no fire protection; plaster down; rentals
during the period collected by defendants amounted to
$51,151.49, with only $36,787.56 paid therefrom on a
contract price of $75,000.00, plus taxes and interest over
a five year period, and "ith all those facts uncontested
defendant asserts, plaintiff
"can at best only recover damages for the use and
occupancy of the premises or such other damages
as they might be able to prove, and that since they
proved no such damages, it was error for the court
to find in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants **•'~
In the e.a~e ei tPd by counsel there "~as no forfeiture clause
in the rontrnet as in the instant case. It is appreciated
that this honorable court has paid little if any attention
to the forfeiture clauses of contracts in any of the cases
dcter1nined. (1enerally, the court has determined what
the court finds to he nn equitable solution to the problen1
and cneh ense has stood on the facts of the case. In no
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case has the court ever found that because the purchaser
had no equity and the rights of the purchaser. under the
contract had been declared null and void that the seller
was under obligation to return the purchaser all the
monies paid on the contract, .a.s proposed by point IV.

CONCLUSIONS·
Much has been stated in the cases to protect the
purchaser. In the instant case as indicated in the Earnest
Th{oney Receipt, the plaintiff was under obligation to pay
the re.altor's commission of five percent of the purchase
price, a sum of $3,750.00, plaintiff prayed for treble damages for the hold over of defendants and proved the hold
over and the reasonable rental value of the properties,
plaintiff offered to not enforce the forfeiture provision
at e.ach step in the proceedings if plaintiff would be but
made whole, plaintiff notes that practically $15,000.00
over and above the rentals actually collected were not
paid to plaintiff on said contr.act, and plaintiff asks no
affirmative relief even though under the law plain tiff is
entitled to the same.
It is earnestly submitted that every consideration
possible was given defendants but nothing was done by
defendants to relieve plaintiffs and there is nothing in
this record of any attempt being made to relieve plaintiffs
or even give plaintiffs what plaintiffs were entitled to
under the contract. It is respectfully submitted that the
defendants defaulted under the contract; that plaintiff is
awarded nothing and receives nothing that is not provided for in the contract; that defendants took more in
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tiffs on the contract by $15,000.00; and that defendants
had no equity in the run down delapidated premises that
no one .appraised as having anywhere near the value of
the purchase price and even with the severest application
of the conditions of the contract plaintiffs are not and
could not be made whole. It is earnestly represented that
the judgment should be affirmed with costs to respond8nts.
Respectfully submitted,
CANNON AND DUFFIN

By T.

QUENTIN CANNON

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
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